Asemanarea intre parlamentari si ziaristi o reprezinta perceptia in societate. Singura diferenta relevanta, este, din pacate, imunitatea. Date fiind aceste repere, se procedeaza intensiv la subminarea ambelor categorii "profesionale".
La capitolul "activitatea parlamentarilor" putem enumera suspendarea presedintelui si motiuni de cenzura respinse de fiecare data, dar sa nu omitem parte din majoritatea legilor scrise in regimul "totul redus", fie posturi, fie bani, prezentate sub denumirea de "comasare" in scopul "debirocratizarii" serviciilor. Singura activitate care este sub semnul intrebarii, din punctul meu de vedere, este cea a Comisiei de ancheta a serviciilor de informatii, despre care nu se discuta decat ocazional, eventual cand se iveste o campanie internationala de presa. Uneori nici atunci. A trecut ceva vreme de cand nu am mai auzit de interpelari si imi pun o intrebare fireasca: Cine saboteaza demersurile jurnalistice ce au ca unica menire declarata informarea poporului prin orice mijloace? Probabil ca orice persoana constienta de faptul ca serviciul de expertiza imagistica de la Ministerul Justitiei poate fi contestat din simplul motiv ca nu se poate face o contraexpertiza in Romania iar entitatile interesate trebuie sa dispuna de resurse pentru analiza in afara tarii.
Revenind la subiectele de pe ordinea de zi, de ce a fost Dan Diaconescu arestat? Cred ca cel mai simplu si realist raspuns este: Pentru ca s-a putut. Ce efecte are? Rating maxim la OTV, rating redus la celelalte televiziuni si, bineinteles, scaderea dramatica a perceptiei asupra libertatii presei in Romania, incredere evaluata de instiutele de monitorizare din afara tarii printr-o procedura ce prevede aplicarea unor chestionare standard unui numar de 20 subiecti. Daca se intampla ca 5 dintre repondenti sa fie ziaristi iar restul tarani, e clara situatia.
Depasind momentul, cred ca cea mai mare temere a politicienilor, indiferent de pozitia pe care o ocupa, este legata de informatiile contradictorii care circula atat on cat si off the record. Nu stiu de ce, insa traiesc cu impresia ca traversam o perioada in care se reitereaza povestea cu adevarul despre Mos Craciun. Un exemplu ar fi istoria cu gripa aviara, in care nici presedintele nu cred ca avea foarte multa incredere, daca ma gandesc ca a putut sa deguste pui in direct la televizor doar sa demonstreze natiunii ca nu e infestat. Puiul, bineinteles. Trebuie insa mentionat ca parte din natiune nu stie ca in spatele presedintelui sunt sute de angajati SPP care monitorizeaza orice miscare inainte ca turturica sa intre in scena. Sau era fazanul? Nu mai conteaza.
Alta situatie de forta majora a fost vaccinul expirat de la Cantacuzino. Din punctul meu de vedere, acest lucru chiar merita intrunirea oficiala a CSAT. Intrunirea probabil ca a fost, insa nu oficial. In aceasta situatie era vorba despre o serie de acreditari si niste banuti ce trebuiau dati anumitor enitati interesate sa bulverseze populatia. In mod cert era o chestiune de siguranta nationala din moment ce OMS a ridicat gradul de alerta la 6.
O alta problema care, in opinia mea, va necesita ulterior atentie discretionara a forurilor nationale si internationale va fi imposibilitatea de plata a utilitatilor de catre populatie. In acest sens vor apela guvernul si primariile la mica intelegere legiferata cel putin pana in 2012 cu furnizorii locali sau Romania risca sa fie declarata focar de infectie? In acest caz cu siguranta ca va fi nevoie de modificarea Constitutiei. Daca se va ajunge la un acord si, in spirit pur romanesc, se va crea o politica de monopol, cum se vor plati amenzile date ce UE? Caci am convingerea ca se vor da amenzi mari. Sa speram totusi ca nu vom ajunge in situatia in care sa ne restrangem granitele dupa victoria limitata cu Insula Serpilor, ca tot se discuta de atata vreme reorganizarea administrativa a spatiului autohton.
28 aprilie 2010
Moody's: Likely to maintain negative outlooks for most European emerging banking systems
By Francesco Meucci
Report Number: 124447/Romania
The report concludes that, for this year, Moody"s is likely to maintain negative outlooks for banking systems in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic countries, due to continued negative pressure on financial fundamentals and the still challenging economic environment in many of those countries. Evidence of stabilisation have begun to emerge in a few countries however and the agency says that the outlook for the banking systems in Poland, Russia, Slovakia and Czech Republic could be changed to stable from negative in the second half of 2010.
Report Number: 124447/Romania
Tough economic conditions likely to prevail in 2010, thus underpinning the banking system’s negative credit outlook.
The credit outlook for the Romanian banking system is negative, driven mainly by the still difficult economic conditions in the country following a severe recession in 2009 as a result of the global financial crisis. The economic environment in 2010 is likely to be a challenging year for the banks,leading to sizeable loan loss provisions and lower profitability, although concerns about liquidity and capital have diminished following the liquidity crunch in the market in late-2008. However, any systemic risks are alleviated by the commitment that those foreign institutions with Romanian bank
subsidiaries have made to the IMF to support these entities and maintain their exposures in the country.
Minimum conditions to attain a stable outlook are as follows:
» An improving operating environment: sustainable positive GDP growth combined with a lower unemployment rate
» A halt in the deteriorating loan quality trend: stabilisation of the loan quality trends and a gradual reversal towards improvement
» Earnings to be less affected by credit costs: improvements in the banks’ bottom-line profitability,which was severely affected by loan loss provisions
» Liquidity metrics to be less of an issue: increased funding through deposits and reduced dependence on borrowings will lead to an improved liquidity profile
» Maintaining comfortable capitalisation: capitalisation remains strong with parent banks
continuing to support their Romanian subsidiaries in case of need
Expected credit trends in 2010:
Operating Environment – Negative impact: We regard the deteriorating operating environment in Romania in recent quarters as the most challenging aspect faced by the banking system, given the contraction in GDP of around 7.5% in 2009 and the relatively weak growth of around 2.3% expected in 2010. The knock-on effect on the country from the global financial crisis was considerable in 2009, characterised by a contracting economy, rising unemployment and challenging macroeconomic prospects. However, the €20 billion international aid package committed to the country – mainly from the IMF and the European Commission (EC) as well as from the World Bank and other international financial institutions – will help to restore market confidence following a sharp drop in
capital inflows. We believe that the operating environment will remain challenging, with GDP growth not expected to accelerate to around 4% before 2011.
Asset quality – Negative impact: Asset quality challenges arising from the tough economic conditions in the country have been the main source of concern for Romanian banks given the sharp increase in the level of problem loans and credit costs during 2009. Although Romanian banks did not have any exposure to toxic assets related to US sub-prime mortgages, the global deleveraging process that caused the slowdown in the Romanian economy has exposed them to loan quality problems following years of rapid credit growth averaging around 50% during 2004-2007. We are particularly concerned
regarding the high proportion of foreign currency lending mainly to unhedged households, as the weaker local currency elevates their credit risk profile. Loans classified as ‘doubtful’ and ‘loss’ under the relatively conservative local classification norms surged to 15.3% of total gross loans as at YE2009 from 6.5% at YE2008 and 4% at YE2007.
Capital adequacy – Neutral impact: Romanian banks’ adequate capitalisation was able to absorb the shocks in the economy, with no systemically important banks facing any solvency issues during the crisis period. The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) for the banking system was 14.03% at YE2009 while the leverage ratio (Tier 1 capital/Total Average Assets) was 7.11%, compared to 13.76% and 8.13%, respectively, at YE2008. We expect foreign banks to continue supporting their Romanian subsidiaries in case of any capital needs, given the significant growth potential presented by the relatively under-
banked Romanian market. Moreover, Romanian banks have to maintain at least a 10% CAR, as per the IMF’s recommendation to the local regulators, which provides ample buffer to absorb any future possible loan losses on the back of weaker internal capital generation expected in 2010.
Liquidity – Neutral impact: Stressed liquidity in the banking system in late-2008 was subsequently normalised in 2009, although liquidity ratios remain tight as foreign currency funding needs are mainly met by borrowings from the Romanian banks’ foreign parent banks (accounting for 85% of the system’s total assets). The loan-to-deposit ratio is still high at around 113% as at 2009, although lower than the 122% the prior year, reflecting the certain Romanian banks’ reliance on wholesale funding. However, the commitments made by foreign parent banks as part of the IMF/EC aid package to
support their Romanian subsidiaries provide some comfort.
Profitability – Negative impact: Higher loan loss provisions combined with higher funding costs during 2009 have depressed profitability, a scenario that is likely to continue throughout 2010. Profitability was significantly impacted in 2009, with the return on assets (RoA) for the whole banking system declining considerably to 0.24%, from 1.56% in 2008 and 1.01% in 2007. Return on equity (RoE) also declined in 2009 to a low 2.73%, from 17.04% in 2008 and 9.43% in 2007.
Conclusion: Looking ahead, Romanian banks’ financial performance and metrics are likely to remain under pressure amid still challenging macroeconomic prospects, underscoring the negative credit outlook we have assigned to the banking system. Any positive developments with regard to the above-mentioned rating drivers during 2010 would support a possible change in the credit outlook to stable from negative. The Romanian banking system has shown relative resilience to the various shocks in the global and local economy so far, although its creditworthiness weakened during 2009 as a result of the
lower earning streams and higher credit costs.
5 martie 2010
Cu trenul fara saboti. Editia '79
Plimbarea cu metroul in Bucuresti este, de obicei, o aventura. Pe langa aglomeratie, infiltratii de apa si mirosuri exagerat de patrunzatoare chiar si dimineata, in urma cu doua zile a trebuit sa stau in metrou mai mult decat era programat. Motivul? Defectiuni tehnice la unul din acele trenuri ce au fost date in folosinta in '79. Din pacate, mai grave ca de obicei.
Povestea a inceput asa: Am urcat in tren in jurul orei 17.30 de la statia Politehnica. Ca de obicei, in ultimul vagon. Era lejer. Intre statia Timpuri Noi si Mihai Bravu se opreste trenul in tunel. Mecanicul anunta ca trenul stationeaza din cauze tehnice. De regula, angajati Metrorex sunt rezervati sa anunte probleme de orice fel. E drept ca mi s-a mai intamplat o data sa fiu intr-un metrou, evident, tot in ultimul vagon, si sa iasa fum iar mecanicul sa faca urmatorul anunt: "Stimati calatori, nu s-a intamplat nimic", insa, de obicei, mecanicii isi rezerva dreptul de a se abtine de la comunicarea cu publicul calator in cazul unor defectiuni minore. Asadar, in acesta situatie, cu siguranta era ceva destul de grav.
La scurt timp dupa anunt apare unul dintre mecanici in ultimul vagon. A ajuns din primul vagon in ultimul. Prin urmare, situatia era critica. Se comunica intensiv cu dispecerul pentru aducerea unei alte garnituri care urma sa fie conectata la ultimul vagon pentru a impinge trenul.
Intre timp, cu lumina de avarie pornita, mai multi calatori se distreaza maxim la idea ca poate ar ajuta sa impinga trenul. Langa mine, o domnisoara incepe sa isi sune toate cunostiintele sa le puna la curent cu situatia de fapt, respectiv ca va intarzia la film pentru ca s-a stricat metroul. La un moment dat iese si mecanicul si ne spune sa ne pastram calmul. Din tonul vocii insa deduc ca nici el nu era foarte convins de ce spune.
Dupa circa 15 minute de stationare si doua tentative esuate de a scoate trenul din tunel vine si garnitura de rezerva. Evident, tot editia '79. A inceput partea a doua a aventurii. Conectarea garniturii se face, fireste, prin cabluri de inalta tensiune cu un amperaj periculos. Angajatii Metrorex incep sa lege firele. Se intreaba de zece ori fiecare daca au fost izolate cablurile. Se mai tipa de doua ori, apoi se ia, din nou, curentul de pe tren, dupa care se aprinde lumina. Sta circa un minut pe avarie, se stinge si, din nou, se aprinde. In fine, ne miscam. Incetisor intram in statia Mihai Bravu. Un nume predestinat.
Ajunsi in statie avem o alta problema. Nu se pot deschide usile, probabil pentru ca nu mai este aer comprimat. Unde s-a dus nu stiu, insa ma bucur ca mecanicul reuseste sa deschida patru usi. Manual, bineinteles. Din sase vagoane incepe evacuarea calatorilor. Se deschid usile intre vagoane si lumea se arunca buluc sa iasa. Ies si eu incetisor din tren.
Am ajuns pe peron. Acolo, un alt mecanic a inceput sa raporteze ca s-ar fi furat doi saboti de la tren. Ce? Cum adica sa se fure doi saboti de la tren? Deci, sabotul, adica o parte din mecanismul de franare, a fost furat. Came again? Pai nu e paza la metrou? Pai e. Avem in fiecare statie de metrou cate un specimen specializat in batut aurolacii. Si nu stiu de ce, insa am impresia ca habar nu au cum arata un sabot de dama, dar'mite unul de tren. Deci, paza nu avem. Pai si trenurile nu se verifica inainte de a fi scoase din depou? Teoretic, da. Deci, se numara vagoanele. Sunt toate? OK. Asadar, sa purcedem. Pai cum ramane cu siguranta calatorilor? Pai sunt in siguranta ca nu se deschid usile. OK. E de bine. Doar sa nu murim gazati in metrou, ca de altceva nu stiu daca ar trebui sa ma tem.
Dar sa ne amintim si de incidentul din 2007 cand o garnitura Bombardier, celebra firma Bombardier, a avut o cadere de tensiune si a ramas blocata intre statiile Piata Muncii si Dristor, iar calatorii au fost nevoiti sa circule prin tunel pana la suprafata. In acest caz sunt anonimi care sustin pe forumuri ca in acea zona nu exista alimentare pe sine iar trenurile vechi circula "din inertie si fara curent", in timp ce trenurile noi franeaza automat la disparitia tensiunii pentru a proteja calatorii. Deci, daca ipoteza e viabila, inseamna ca trenurile vechi circula pe acel tronson pentru ca nu se pot opri, iar la trenurile noi probabil ca au fost modificati parametrii de functionare pentru a nu se opri. Oficial, nimeni nu scoate o vorba despre remedierea acestor probleme, insa toata conducerea anunta de fiecare data cu bucurie ca vor sa mai faca inca o magistrala.
Sa nu ne intristam insa pentru ca, desi avem multe lipsuri, un beneficiu pentru plata taxei de calatorie este crowl-ul de la Realitatea difuzat la metrou. De asemenea, sa nu omitem si sprijinul excesiv acordat proiectelor culturale de genul "Se cauta cele mai frumoase poezii ale copiilor din oras" in timp ce, in zilele ploioase poti face relaxat un dus la metrou. E apa din belsug. In anumite zone, probabil in cantitati mai mari decat afara. O idee ar fi reprofilarea companiei. Macar ca ar scapa de amenintarile cu reducerea salariilor si tot am castiga ceva cu totii.
Unul din trenurile date in folosinta la inceputul anilor '80, inainte de aparitia crizei vopselei galbene ce urma sa afecteze economia Romaniei Socialiste
Povestea a inceput asa: Am urcat in tren in jurul orei 17.30 de la statia Politehnica. Ca de obicei, in ultimul vagon. Era lejer. Intre statia Timpuri Noi si Mihai Bravu se opreste trenul in tunel. Mecanicul anunta ca trenul stationeaza din cauze tehnice. De regula, angajati Metrorex sunt rezervati sa anunte probleme de orice fel. E drept ca mi s-a mai intamplat o data sa fiu intr-un metrou, evident, tot in ultimul vagon, si sa iasa fum iar mecanicul sa faca urmatorul anunt: "Stimati calatori, nu s-a intamplat nimic", insa, de obicei, mecanicii isi rezerva dreptul de a se abtine de la comunicarea cu publicul calator in cazul unor defectiuni minore. Asadar, in acesta situatie, cu siguranta era ceva destul de grav.
La scurt timp dupa anunt apare unul dintre mecanici in ultimul vagon. A ajuns din primul vagon in ultimul. Prin urmare, situatia era critica. Se comunica intensiv cu dispecerul pentru aducerea unei alte garnituri care urma sa fie conectata la ultimul vagon pentru a impinge trenul.
Intre timp, cu lumina de avarie pornita, mai multi calatori se distreaza maxim la idea ca poate ar ajuta sa impinga trenul. Langa mine, o domnisoara incepe sa isi sune toate cunostiintele sa le puna la curent cu situatia de fapt, respectiv ca va intarzia la film pentru ca s-a stricat metroul. La un moment dat iese si mecanicul si ne spune sa ne pastram calmul. Din tonul vocii insa deduc ca nici el nu era foarte convins de ce spune.
Dupa circa 15 minute de stationare si doua tentative esuate de a scoate trenul din tunel vine si garnitura de rezerva. Evident, tot editia '79. A inceput partea a doua a aventurii. Conectarea garniturii se face, fireste, prin cabluri de inalta tensiune cu un amperaj periculos. Angajatii Metrorex incep sa lege firele. Se intreaba de zece ori fiecare daca au fost izolate cablurile. Se mai tipa de doua ori, apoi se ia, din nou, curentul de pe tren, dupa care se aprinde lumina. Sta circa un minut pe avarie, se stinge si, din nou, se aprinde. In fine, ne miscam. Incetisor intram in statia Mihai Bravu. Un nume predestinat.
Ajunsi in statie avem o alta problema. Nu se pot deschide usile, probabil pentru ca nu mai este aer comprimat. Unde s-a dus nu stiu, insa ma bucur ca mecanicul reuseste sa deschida patru usi. Manual, bineinteles. Din sase vagoane incepe evacuarea calatorilor. Se deschid usile intre vagoane si lumea se arunca buluc sa iasa. Ies si eu incetisor din tren.
Am ajuns pe peron. Acolo, un alt mecanic a inceput sa raporteze ca s-ar fi furat doi saboti de la tren. Ce? Cum adica sa se fure doi saboti de la tren? Deci, sabotul, adica o parte din mecanismul de franare, a fost furat. Came again? Pai nu e paza la metrou? Pai e. Avem in fiecare statie de metrou cate un specimen specializat in batut aurolacii. Si nu stiu de ce, insa am impresia ca habar nu au cum arata un sabot de dama, dar'mite unul de tren. Deci, paza nu avem. Pai si trenurile nu se verifica inainte de a fi scoase din depou? Teoretic, da. Deci, se numara vagoanele. Sunt toate? OK. Asadar, sa purcedem. Pai cum ramane cu siguranta calatorilor? Pai sunt in siguranta ca nu se deschid usile. OK. E de bine. Doar sa nu murim gazati in metrou, ca de altceva nu stiu daca ar trebui sa ma tem.
Dar sa ne amintim si de incidentul din 2007 cand o garnitura Bombardier, celebra firma Bombardier, a avut o cadere de tensiune si a ramas blocata intre statiile Piata Muncii si Dristor, iar calatorii au fost nevoiti sa circule prin tunel pana la suprafata. In acest caz sunt anonimi care sustin pe forumuri ca in acea zona nu exista alimentare pe sine iar trenurile vechi circula "din inertie si fara curent", in timp ce trenurile noi franeaza automat la disparitia tensiunii pentru a proteja calatorii. Deci, daca ipoteza e viabila, inseamna ca trenurile vechi circula pe acel tronson pentru ca nu se pot opri, iar la trenurile noi probabil ca au fost modificati parametrii de functionare pentru a nu se opri. Oficial, nimeni nu scoate o vorba despre remedierea acestor probleme, insa toata conducerea anunta de fiecare data cu bucurie ca vor sa mai faca inca o magistrala.
Sa nu ne intristam insa pentru ca, desi avem multe lipsuri, un beneficiu pentru plata taxei de calatorie este crowl-ul de la Realitatea difuzat la metrou. De asemenea, sa nu omitem si sprijinul excesiv acordat proiectelor culturale de genul "Se cauta cele mai frumoase poezii ale copiilor din oras" in timp ce, in zilele ploioase poti face relaxat un dus la metrou. E apa din belsug. In anumite zone, probabil in cantitati mai mari decat afara. O idee ar fi reprofilarea companiei. Macar ca ar scapa de amenintarile cu reducerea salariilor si tot am castiga ceva cu totii.
EBRD: Cooperation is the best explanation of why there has not been a banking crisis in south-eastern Europe
By Marjola Xhunga
In a recent working paper, Peter Sanfey, lead economist at the EBRD, explains how the crisis evolved and how it has affected this region.
You note in the paper that south-eastern Europe was blissfully unaware of the crisis in 2007 and 2008. Why?
The region had really taken off in the past decade. It has had a number of years of high growth, low inflation, record inflows of foreign direct investment and there was a lot of confidence building in the region. So when the global crisis hit in 2007, initially there was a feeling that south-eastern Europe wouldn’t be so badly affected. But we all – the countries involved and outside commentators – underestimated the extent to which this region would be affected by the crisis. By the end of 2008, it was clear that south-eastern Europe was going to experience a big shock. And that is what happened.
The paper explains some of the reasons why the region was affected, what were the most important factors in driving the downturn and what the reactions were of policy makers, central banks and also people in the region. One of the most important points I emphasise in the paper is that the region has reacted maturely to the crisis. It has reacted perhaps better than many people expected. In saying this, I would like to remind readers that south-eastern Europe still has an image problem – an image of being inherently volatile – which it is still working to shake off. The last 10 years have helped to dispel that image, which has been severely tested by the financial crisis.
What was the region’s reaction to the crisis?
Governments have responded sensibly. Throughout the region, professionally-managed central banks have introduced sensible monitoring policies to mitigate the worst effects of the crisis. Businesses struggling with the crisis have at times shortened working hours or cut jobs but they haven’t been overreacting. The banking system in the region has also proven to be stable and we have seen no big banks fail. There also appears to be a wide understanding among the people in the region of the truly historic and global nature of the crisis and an awareness that the fact that their economies are struggling and that unemployment is rising is not necessarily their governments’ fault. This explains why we have seen relatively few strikes and street protests in the region. There have been isolated cases of workers’ protests in several countries, including Romania and Serbia, but generally speaking people in the region have reacted maturely to the crisis.
What has been the impact of the crisis so far?
It differs from one country to the other. For example, Albania seems to have escaped the crisis relatively unscathed and managed to record positive growth in 2009. On the other hand, Romania, the largest economy in south-eastern Europe, was quite severely hit by the crisis and recorded a GDP fall of more than 7 per cent.
Although there have been differences among countries, there is a general recognition that governments had limited room for manoeuvre. They were not in the position of having massive deficit-financed packages of the US or the UK type but they received support from the IMF, the EBRD, the EIB and the World Bank, all of which stepped up investments and assistance to the region to help it overcome the crisis.
In what form did the support come to these countries?
The support has been multifaceted. The IMF is present in countries such as Serbia, Romania and Bosnia and Herzegovina with formal programmes. Romania for example received a combined package of €20 billion from the IMF, the EU, the EBRD and the World Bank. This was a very strong signal by the international community in support of the one country in south-eastern Europe that was perhaps the most affected.
It is important to note that IMF support has been combined with a major new initiative known as the Vienna Initiative. It is a unique first-time cooperation among international financial institutions, including the IMF, the EBRD, the World Bank and the home central banks, the host central banks and foreign banks with subsidiaries in the region. The existence of such an initiative proved that cooperation is in everyone’s interest.
By signalling support for the region, participants in the initiative are assuring investors that they believe that sensible macroeconomic policies will be carried out, in the context of IMF-supported programmes. Most importantly, private banks are signalling their long-term commitment by maintaining levels of exposure and support for their subsidiaries in the region. This wide cooperation is the best explanation of why there has not been a banking crisis in south-eastern Europe.
Is the worst over in south-eastern Europe?
There are plenty of grounds for cautious optimism on this point. Some economies are showing visible signs of recovery and we do not expect negative growth in any country of this region this year. But there are still significant downside risks and we may be unpleasantly surprised again. One thing we have to watch closely is how the current crisis in Greece will play out, as a number of major Greek banks and companies are very active in south-eastern Europe.
A severe downturn in Greece could also adversely affect the flow of remittances back to certain countries, notably Albania. It highlights once again an important message – that south-eastern Europe is part of the global economy and can no longer be insulated from events elsewhere.
Peter Sanfey (Photo: St. Antony's College)
In a recent working paper, Peter Sanfey, lead economist at the EBRD, explains how the crisis evolved and how it has affected this region.
You note in the paper that south-eastern Europe was blissfully unaware of the crisis in 2007 and 2008. Why?
The region had really taken off in the past decade. It has had a number of years of high growth, low inflation, record inflows of foreign direct investment and there was a lot of confidence building in the region. So when the global crisis hit in 2007, initially there was a feeling that south-eastern Europe wouldn’t be so badly affected. But we all – the countries involved and outside commentators – underestimated the extent to which this region would be affected by the crisis. By the end of 2008, it was clear that south-eastern Europe was going to experience a big shock. And that is what happened.
The paper explains some of the reasons why the region was affected, what were the most important factors in driving the downturn and what the reactions were of policy makers, central banks and also people in the region. One of the most important points I emphasise in the paper is that the region has reacted maturely to the crisis. It has reacted perhaps better than many people expected. In saying this, I would like to remind readers that south-eastern Europe still has an image problem – an image of being inherently volatile – which it is still working to shake off. The last 10 years have helped to dispel that image, which has been severely tested by the financial crisis.
What was the region’s reaction to the crisis?
Governments have responded sensibly. Throughout the region, professionally-managed central banks have introduced sensible monitoring policies to mitigate the worst effects of the crisis. Businesses struggling with the crisis have at times shortened working hours or cut jobs but they haven’t been overreacting. The banking system in the region has also proven to be stable and we have seen no big banks fail. There also appears to be a wide understanding among the people in the region of the truly historic and global nature of the crisis and an awareness that the fact that their economies are struggling and that unemployment is rising is not necessarily their governments’ fault. This explains why we have seen relatively few strikes and street protests in the region. There have been isolated cases of workers’ protests in several countries, including Romania and Serbia, but generally speaking people in the region have reacted maturely to the crisis.
What has been the impact of the crisis so far?
It differs from one country to the other. For example, Albania seems to have escaped the crisis relatively unscathed and managed to record positive growth in 2009. On the other hand, Romania, the largest economy in south-eastern Europe, was quite severely hit by the crisis and recorded a GDP fall of more than 7 per cent.
Although there have been differences among countries, there is a general recognition that governments had limited room for manoeuvre. They were not in the position of having massive deficit-financed packages of the US or the UK type but they received support from the IMF, the EBRD, the EIB and the World Bank, all of which stepped up investments and assistance to the region to help it overcome the crisis.
In what form did the support come to these countries?
The support has been multifaceted. The IMF is present in countries such as Serbia, Romania and Bosnia and Herzegovina with formal programmes. Romania for example received a combined package of €20 billion from the IMF, the EU, the EBRD and the World Bank. This was a very strong signal by the international community in support of the one country in south-eastern Europe that was perhaps the most affected.
It is important to note that IMF support has been combined with a major new initiative known as the Vienna Initiative. It is a unique first-time cooperation among international financial institutions, including the IMF, the EBRD, the World Bank and the home central banks, the host central banks and foreign banks with subsidiaries in the region. The existence of such an initiative proved that cooperation is in everyone’s interest.
By signalling support for the region, participants in the initiative are assuring investors that they believe that sensible macroeconomic policies will be carried out, in the context of IMF-supported programmes. Most importantly, private banks are signalling their long-term commitment by maintaining levels of exposure and support for their subsidiaries in the region. This wide cooperation is the best explanation of why there has not been a banking crisis in south-eastern Europe.
Is the worst over in south-eastern Europe?
There are plenty of grounds for cautious optimism on this point. Some economies are showing visible signs of recovery and we do not expect negative growth in any country of this region this year. But there are still significant downside risks and we may be unpleasantly surprised again. One thing we have to watch closely is how the current crisis in Greece will play out, as a number of major Greek banks and companies are very active in south-eastern Europe.
A severe downturn in Greece could also adversely affect the flow of remittances back to certain countries, notably Albania. It highlights once again an important message – that south-eastern Europe is part of the global economy and can no longer be insulated from events elsewhere.
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